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CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
WITHDRAWAL RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF
TREATIES
CURTIS A. BRADLEY* AND MITU GULATI**
INTRODUCTION
The conventional wisdom among international law scholars is that,
once a rule of customary international law (“CIL”) becomes established,
nations never have the unilateral right to withdraw from it. Instead, if they
want to act in a way that is contrary to the rule, they must either violate it
and hope that other nations acquiesce in the violation, or they must
persuade other nations to enter into a treaty that overrides the CIL rule. In
Withdrawing from International Custom, we termed this conventional
wisdom the “Mandatory View” of CIL.1
As we explained in Withdrawing, the Mandatory View of CIL can be
contrasted with the withdrawal rights that frequently exist under treaties.
When nations expressly negotiate the creation of treaty obligations, they
often include within the treaty a right of withdrawal, sometimes
conditioned upon a period of notice. Even when they do not make such an
agreement expressly, the subject matter of the treaty will sometimes itself
suggest an implicit right of withdrawal. Moreover, even when there is no
general right of withdrawal from a treaty, nations typically will have some
right of withdrawal for situations in which there has been a fundamental
change of circumstances. Finally, nations often have the ability to remain a
party to a treaty while avoiding the application of particular provisions
within the treaty through the use of reservations or the invocation of
derogation clauses.2
This dichotomy between no exit rights under CIL and frequent and
variegated exit rights under treaties is puzzling, for several reasons.
Treaties and CIL are the two major sources of international law, and their
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1. See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J.
202, 205 (2010).
2. For discussion of these various exit options under treaties, see id. at 270-71.
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substantive content frequently overlaps. Moreover, it is in many ways more
difficult to create international law through treaty than through custom,
since a treaty requires an express act of ratification. As a result, one might
expect that, if anything, it would be more difficult to exit from treaties than
from CIL, rather than the opposite.
We searched in the literature and found almost no explanation for the
Mandatory View, and what little we did find was brief and conclusory. We
attempted to trace the intellectual roots of the Mandatory View, but this
produced only additional puzzles. We found, for example, that a number of
the classic international law commentators of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries thought that nations could unilaterally exit from at least some CIL
rules.3 In addition, we found that the intellectual shift to the Mandatory
View began to take place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries and may have been part of an effort to ensure that “uncivilized”
nations would be bound to the CIL worked out by a handful of powerful
Western countries, something that raises questions about the normative
underpinnings of the Mandatory View. Furthermore, we found that the one
exception under the Mandatory View to the ban on unilateral exit—the socalled “persistent objector doctrine”—is a modern creation that did not
become established until well after World War II and appears to have been
in part a response to continuing uncertainties about how the Mandatory
View would operate in practice.
After reviewing this history, we considered the Mandatory View from
the perspective of institutional design. Because there was so little
theoretical defense of the Mandatory View in the literature, we were
compelled to speculate about what might be the best arguments in favor of
that View. To gain traction on this issue, we drew from theoretical work
that has been done concerning exit rights in the areas of contract law,
constitutional design, and voting rights. We found that, although there are
arguments that can be made to defend the Mandatory View, these
arguments at best apply to only a subset of CIL, most notably where CIL is
designed to address externality or agency problems. We also found that
allowing exit rights under CIL could enhance the usefulness of CIL, by
3. See id. at 215. For a similar account of this history, see William S. Dodge, Customary
International Law in US Courts: Origins of the Later-in-Time Rule, in MAKING TRANSNATIONAL LAW
WORK IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DETLEV VAGTS 531-59 (Pieter H.F. Bekker,
Rudolf Dolzer & Michael Waibel eds., forthcoming 2010). We did not make any claim in Withdrawing
that this history should control the present, and any such claim would need to resolve a number of
difficult “translation” problems in light of changes in international law and the international system.
Our claim about the history was “simply that it shows that the Mandatory View is not the only possible
approach to CIL and that an international legal system could potentially operate despite the allowance
of some CIL withdrawal rights.” Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 225-26.
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making it more transparent and efficient, and by encouraging broader
experimentation. We concluded with some thoughts about how a typology
might be developed to allow for variability in exit rights.
In this symposium issue of the Duke Journal of Comparative and
International Law, a number of leading scholars engage with our project.
Some of these scholars offer critiques of the analysis in Withdrawing, while
others raise practical questions about how our ideas might be implemented.
At minimum, this symposium fills a gap in the literature in terms of setting
forth a sustained assessment of the Mandatory View. We are hopeful that it
will also serve as a platform for additional work concerning withdrawal
rights under CIL. Regardless, we owe an immense debt to the scholars who
took part in the symposium, both for their willingness to consider our ideas
and for their insightful comments.4
In this essay, we seek to advance the analysis set forth in Withdrawing
by addressing four topics: the current state of CIL; the proper way to
conceive of CIL and its relationship to treaties; how a shift away from the
Mandatory View might occur in practice; and whether a shift to a Default
View would make a meaningful difference in state practice. Most of the
criticisms directed at Withdrawing are encompassed within these topics.
We conclude the essay with some observations about additional research
that might be useful.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF CIL
In this Part, we briefly review the current state of CIL, from the
perspective of both theory and practice. If CIL is currently operating well
along these dimensions, this should increase the burden on those arguing
for a change in the way that CIL is conceived. On the other hand, if CIL is
not operating well along these dimensions, some of the objections to a new
conception of CIL—such as concerns about creating uncertainty and
inefficiencies—are reduced.5
A. CIL in Theory
Far from being well understood and accepted, the theory of CIL
today is riddled with uncertainty. While commentators often recite that CIL
is based on some combination of state practice and opinio juris, even a
4. We are also grateful to Brad Clark, Eugene Kontorovich, John McGinnis, Francesco Parisi,
Andreas Paulus, and Amanda Perreau-Saussine, all of whom made valuable contributions to the inperson symposium held at Duke in January 2010 but did not contribute papers to this written
symposium.
5. Cf. Rachel Brewster, Withdrawing from Custom through Treaty: Choosing Between Default
Rules, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 47, 54 (2010).

BRADLEY_GULATI_FMT3.DOC

4

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

1/7/2011 1:31:36 PM

[Vol 21:30

gentle probing of this definition reveals fundamental puzzles and debates. It
is not clear, for example, what counts as state practice. Should a nation’s
treaty practice count? Can evidence of opinio juris, such as positions taken
in international institutions, also constitute state practice? How much state
practice must there be, and for how long? Similar questions abound for
opinio juris. For example, to what extent do the views expressed by a state
with respect to international resolutions or treaty norms count as evidence
of opinio juris for CIL? To what extent can opinio juris be inferred from
practice? More fundamentally, if CIL requires that nations believe that they
are legally obligated, how does that belief arise in the first place? There is
no settled answer to any of these (and numerous other) questions about
CIL.6
Many of these uncertainties are longstanding, but they are now more
pressing because the proliferation of multilateral treaties has raised new
questions about the need for CIL as a distinct source of international law.
Most of the major issue areas that were historically regulated by CIL are
now regulated, to one degree or another, by treaties. Treaties have a variety
of attractions as compared with CIL, in that they provide more direct
evidence of state preferences (since they are the product of express
negotiation), they can provide for greater specificity (since they are
typically in writing), and they can establish institutional mechanisms to
promote monitoring, adjudication, and enforcement of the norms.
Moreover, the development of the United Nations system and other
international institutions after World War II, along with developments in
travel and communications, have greatly facilitated the development of
international law in this form. The possible result, as Joel Trachtman notes,
is the “increasing marginalization of custom.”7
There is an even more fundamental uncertainty surrounding CIL,
which concerns its connection to state consent. Although many
international law commentators dismiss consent as the touchstone for the
legitimacy of international law, there is nothing approaching agreement on
any other theory. Moreover, the explanation that is often given for why
consent is not a requirement is that current international law doctrine,
especially doctrine relating to CIL, is difficult to reconcile with such a
requirement.8 But this is just circular reasoning: international law does not
require consent because it does not require consent. The inclusion of the

6. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 210-11.
7. Joel P. Trachtman, Persistent Objectors, Cooperation, and the Utility of Customary
International Law, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 221, 232 (2010).
8. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 213-14.
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persistent objector doctrine in the standard contemporary account of CIL
only confuses matters further, since most explanations of the doctrine
ground it in the need for state consent.9 If that is true, however, it is not
clear why CIL doctrine categorically rules out the possibility of a
subsequent objector doctrine.
Not surprisingly, these theoretical uncertatainties have made CIL ripe
for critics. Some have questioned whether CIL operates as law.10 Others
have questioned its usefulness and legitimacy.11 Still others have
questioned its normative attractiveness—from the perspective, for example,
of efficiency,12 or democratic accountability.13 As David Bederman notes,
this is a “time when customary international law is coming under attack by
both extreme positivists (who suggest that its processes are illegitimate and
non-transparent) and by those of a naturalist bent (who regard it as merely
pandering to state interests).”14 This growing skepticism has in turn
prompted one scholar to attempt to “save” CIL,15 although most defenders
of CIL have responded by simply ignoring the critiques.
B. CIL in Practice
It is more difficult to ascertain the state of CIL in practice, but there
are a variety of reasons to believe that it is less than ideal. As Paul Stephan
discusses, although international law commentators frequently write as if
there were a single body of CIL, this does not describe actual practice.16
There is instead an ever growing cacophony of claims about the content of
CIL, with no identifiable hierarchy among these voices. The “CIL” invoked
9. See id. at 233; see also Patrick Dumberry, The Last Citadel! Can a State Claim the Status of
Persistent Objector to Prevent the Application of a Rule of Customary International Law in InvestorState Arbitration?, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 379, 389-391 (2010).
10. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23-43
(2005).
11. See, e.g., J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L.
449 (2000).
12. See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in International Law, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 859, 889-94 (2006).
13. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59
STAN. L. REV. 1175 (2007).
14. David J. Bederman, Acquiescence, Objection and the Death of Customary International Law,
21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 31, 43 (2010); see also Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary
International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 116, 117 (2005) (noting that “CIL is under attack from all
sides” and that “virtually everyone agrees that the theory and doctrine of CIL is a mess”); George
Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 541, 541
(2005) (“[CIL] is under attack as behaviorally epiphenomenal and doctrinally incoherent.”).
15. See generally Guzman, supra note 14.
16. See Paul B. Stephan, Disaggregating Customary International Law, 21 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 191 (2010).
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by international institutions differs as between these institutions, and it also
differs from the “CIL” invoked by NGOs, domestic courts, executive
spokespersons, and other actors. There is consequently a danger that CIL is
simply becoming, to use Sam Estreicher’s term, a form of “law-speak.”17
The nature of the claims about CIL also appear to have fundamentally
changed in recent years. When actors make claims about CIL, they often
fail to tie the claims to empirical assessments of state practice. Instead,
these actors cite treaties, the resolutions of international bodies, claims by
scholars, or normative arguments. When state practice is cited, the citations
are often selective and partial. Moreover, when state practice contradicts a
purported CIL norm (as it frequently does for issues relating to human
rights and the use of force, for example), the contrary practice is dismissed
as mere violations of the norm. In some instances, the label “CIL” is simply
used to avoid international or domestic restrictions that are associated with
treaties.
CIL is also sufficiently vague, and the mechanisms of its enforcement
are sufficiently limited, that nations almost certainly “exit” from it
regularly without saying so. Instead of invoking a formal withdrawal right,
nations dissemble about the content of CIL or attempt to conceal their
violations.18 The end result is uncertainty and unpredictability in the
content of CIL, and a diminishment of its legitimacy.19 Moreover, as we
discussed in Withdrawing, these de facto exit rights vary substantially
depending on a nation’s power and resources, thereby exacerbating
normative concerns that already exist about the structure of CIL.20 These
concerns include, among other things, the possibility that the Mandatory
View of CIL was developed as part of an effort to maintain colonial
domination.21
Some commentators have suggested that all would be well if the
system limited itself to “old” rather than “new” CIL.22 Old CIL is
developed inductively from widespread and longstanding patterns of state

17. See Samuel Estreicher, A Post-Formation Right of Withdrawal from Customary Interntaional
Law?: Some Cautionary Notes, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 57, 59 (2010); see also Kelly, supra note
11, at 453 (“The ‘custom-speak’ used in international legal discourse is an indeterminate, normative
discourse that varies from writer to writer and state to state.”).
18. Hans Morgenthau famously described this problem with CIL more than sixty years ago. See
HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 214 (1948).
19. See C.L. Lim & Olufemi Elias, Withdrawing from Custom and the Paradox of Consensualism
in International Law, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 143 (2010).
20. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 261-62.
21. See id. at 230.
22. See Estreicher, supra note 17, at 62; Edward T. Swaine, Bespoke Custom, 21 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 207 (2010).
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behavior. New CIL, by contrast, is more deductive and is characterized by
reliance on international resolutions, treaties, scholarly opinion, and similar
materials to establish the content of CIL, and by the influence of non-state
actors such as NGOs.23
This nostalgia for the old CIL highlights the fact that the current CIL
system has not succeeded in generating consensus. In any event, the
nostalgia is unrealistic because international and domestic adjudicators
routinely rely on (and create) new CIL materials, and there is no reason to
believe that this practice will change.24 Moreover, the new CIL has
significant support in both the NGO community and the legal academy
because (among other things), it gives those constituencies a greater voice
in CIL creation.25 The nostalgia for the old CIL is also inattentive to
history. As discussed in Withdrawing, CIL was historically dictated by a
handful of Western powers, and restrictions on exit from the old CIL were
likely adopted as a way for the Western powers to impose their rules on the
new entrants to the system.26
The old CIL is also now less relevant in light of the rise of treaties,
and it is structurally ill suited for addressing many contemporary problems.
Indeed, as nations have sought to address the leading international
problems of the twenty-first century, such as terrorism, the proliferation of
nuclear weapons, global warning, and international financial regulation,
they have looked to treaties and written soft law instruments rather than
trying to create old-style CIL. By contrast, the new CIL gives greater voice
to a wider set of interests,27 and it has the potential to address a larger set of
problems than the old CIL.28 Our objection in Withdrawing was not to the
new CIL, but rather to the failure to adapt exit rights to the new system.

23. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 838-42 (1997); Anthea E.
Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95
AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 759 (2006).
24. See, e.g., Roozbeh (Rudy) B. Baker, Customary International Law in the 21st Century: Old
Challenges and New Debates, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 173 (2010).
25. See Roberts, supra note 23, at 775 (noting the increased importance of non-state actors such as
NGOs in CIL creation).
26. Cf. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance Between Modern
and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 667 (2000) (arguing that the old
CIL, like the new CIL, was not grounded heavily in state practice or consent).
27. See Roberts, supra note 23, at 768.
28. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 546-47
(1993). At the same time, the new CIL may entail the need for additional caution with respect to
domestic implementation. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23; McGinnis & Somin, supra note 13.
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III. PROPER CONCEPTION OF CIL
In Withdrawing, our argument for a Default View of CIL drew in part
on an analogy to withdrawal rights under treaties. Some of our respondents
have challenged this analogy on the ground that CIL and treaties are
conceptually different in ways that might be relevant to withdrawal rights.
In particular, these commentators have put forward three conceptions of
CIL that might distinguish it from treaties: CIL as a safety net, CIL as akin
to mandatory domestic public law, and CIL as a social contract.
As we will explain, while the advocates of these conceptions purport
to be defending the status quo, none of the conceptions fits with current
understandings of the structure and content of CIL. Nor have the advocates
of these conceptions explained why the CIL system should be changed so
that it would operate in the way that they envision.
A. CIL as Safety Net
One argument for distinguishing CIL from treaties is to conceive of
CIL as a safety net that ensures that states remain bound by certain basic
rules of international law regardless of whether they stay out of, or
withdraw from, treaties. Thus, for example, Anthea Roberts contends that
the reason that CIL does not allow for a right of withdrawal is that it “sets
the ground rules for the international system by imposing a minimum core
of binding obligations on all states.”29 She also posits that “[t]reaties may
well commonly permit exit precisely because custom, which does not allow
for withdrawal, exists to protect key interests.”30
This conception is simply asserted, and it differs in a number of
respects from standard modern accounts of CIL. Most accounts of
international law view treaties and CIL as separate and equal “sources” that
can be drawn from for various purposes, including international
adjudication and arbitration.31 Under this standard account, sometimes CIL
will exist in the absence of a treaty, sometimes treaties will exist in the
absence of relevant CIL, and sometimes the two will overlap. Moreover,
treaties will sometimes codify CIL, and at other times treaties will

29. Anthea Roberts, Who Killed Article 38(1)(b)? A Reply to Bradley and Gulati, 21 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 173, 173 (2010).
30. Id. at 176. For a similar suggestion, see Dino Kritsiotis, On the Possibilities of and for
Persistent Objection, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 121, 121 (2010).
31. See, e.g., J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 57-62 (6th ed. 1963) (discussing treaties and
custom as separate sources of international law); 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (Robert
Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996) (describing treaties and custom as “the principal and
regular sources of international law”); I.A. SHEARER, STARKE’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 27-28 (11th ed.
1994) (listing custom and treaties among the sources of international law).
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influence the content of CIL. This landscape is much more complicated and
nuanced than suggested by the safety net conception.
The structure of modern CIL formation, which advocates of the safety
conception have not challenged, also seems inconsistent with this
conception. The weight of commentary appears to accept a persistent
objector doctrine, but that doctrine would make no sense if CIL is a safety
net that no state should be able to exempt itself from. In addition, it is
accepted that nations may eliminate CIL obligations as between themselves
by entering into a treaty to that effect, but it is not clear why this would
make sense if CIL were a minimum core that is needed in order for the
international society to operate.
The foregoing inconsistency becomes more evident if one inquires
into the possible rationale behind the safety net. Typically, legal safety
nets, particularly those that provide for minimal standards in agreements,
are designed to protect weaker parties against opportunistic overreaching
by their stronger counterparts.32 As we have explained, however, the
current system of CIL actually seems structured in a way that favors
stronger rather than weaker countries, and the Mandatory View may have
been adopted for precisely that purpose.33 In any event, the safety net
rationale is undermined by the allowance under the Mandatory View of
treaty overrides, a mechanism through which strong nations can bypass the
purported CIL safety net by entering into individual treaties with weaker
countries. These treaty override situations are where a safety net would be
most warranted because the strong nation can take advantage of factors
such as bargaining leverage, the ability to coerce leaders of the weaker
nation, superior information, and greater legal sophistication, and yet we do
not find any protection for the weaker country in this situation under the
prevailing conception of CIL.
Finally, the safety net conception suggests a non-robust role for CIL,
whereby it would regulate only certain minimum standards considered
essential for the functioning of the international system. In Withdrawing,
we acknowledged that it might be sensible for a core “constitutional law”
of the international system to be treated as mandatory,34 but this core is
typically considered to be only a small portion of modern CIL. In fact, as

32. See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALASKA L.
REV. 73, 77-90 (2006).
33. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 230.
34. See id. at 274.

BRADLEY_GULATI_FMT3.DOC

10

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

1/7/2011 1:31:36 PM

[Vol 21:30

Louis Henkin suggested, it might not even be proper to call it CIL.35 It is
unlikely that advocates of this safety net idea are willing to accept the nonrobust role for CIL that it implies. Indeed, many modern arguments about
the content of CIL (such as arguments about a CIL of human rights) depend
on it operating in a manner that is broader and more comprehensive than
treaties—in effect, the opposite of a safety net.
B. Analogy to Mandatory Domestic Public Law
Another way that CIL might be distinguished from treaties is to
analogize to the distinction in domestic law between mandatory public law
and contract law. The argument might go as follows: Treaties are voluntary
and contractual, akin to contracts in a domestic legal system. CIL, by
contrast, is more akin to mandatory domestic public law, such as criminal
law. Although individuals can move in and out of contractual relationships,
we would not expect them to be able to withdraw from the rules of
mandatory domestic public law.36 Thus, for example, individuals cannot
unilaterally or through private contract opt out of domestic law prohibitions
on murder, or prostitution, or tax liability. Thus, the argument goes, nations
should not be able to opt out of CIL rules.
There are a number of problems with this analogy. Mandatory
domestic public law emanates from a central sovereign that has authority to
act on behalf of the community being regulated, whereas CIL is not
developed in that way. Indeed, to the extent there have been modest
developments towards having a central sovereign in the international
community, they have all been accomplished by treaty, not through CIL,
and yet withdrawal rights are still common in the treaty area.
The structure of CIL, as it is commonly described today, is also
inconsistent with the analogy to mandatory domestic public law. For
example, it is well accepted that nations can contract out of rules of CIL, as
between themselves, by entering into treaties. Such contractual flexibility is
not available, however, for mandatory domestic public law, because this
law reflects a decision that private arrangements will undermine the public
interest. In addition, most accounts of modern CIL assume that nations
have a right to opt out of it before it develops by being a persistent
objector. Again, mandatory domestic public law does not work in that
fashion.

35. See LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 32 (1995) (“Such inter-state
constitutional law is not ‘customary law’ in any meaningful sense relevant to an appreciation and
understanding of the ‘sources’ of international law today.”).
36. See Roberts, supra note 29, at 178.
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Nor does the substance of CIL seem to match up with a mandatory
domestic public law conception. Mandatory domestic public law covers
particular subject areas, such as criminal law, and leaves many other issues
to private ordering. As currently conceived, however, CIL covers all issues
of potential inter-state interactions. Moreover, whereas criminal law is the
paradigm example of mandatory domestic public law, it is rare for a breach
of CIL to implicate international criminal responsibility. Instead, breaches
almost always trigger (at most) a right to a private civil remedy, similar to a
breach of contract remedy in a domestic legal system, and international
adjudication of such claims is typically consensual. Furthermore, the
substance of CIL today often overlaps with treaties that contain withdrawal
clauses, and these clauses provide at least some evidence that nations do
not view the subject matter of these treaties as analogous to mandatory
domestic public law.
If anything, treaty law today looks much more analogous to domestic
public law than to CIL. As we explained in Withdrawing, CIL has great
difficulty regulating problems for which there are significant externalities
or free rider problems, such as global warming.37 As a result, international
public regulation of such topics is generally accomplished either by treaty,
or not at all. Nevertheless, we often find withdrawal clauses even in the
most foundational public law treaties, such as in the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty.
There is a small body of international law, which is sometimes
described as a sub-category of CIL, for which the analogy to mandatory
domestic public law seems like a closer fit. It is the body of law known as
jus cogens, or “peremptory norms.” For the small number of international
law norms that are said to fall into this category, such as the prohibition on
genocide, nations are not allowed to contract out of them, even between
themselves, and there is no right of persistent objection.38 Moreover,
international criminal law has been centered around these norms. As we
suggested in Withdrawing, therefore, jus cogens norms are probably a
prime candidate for the Mandatory View.39 The majority of CIL rules,
however, do not fall within this category.
C. CIL as Social Contract
A third conception of CIL that might distinguish it from treaties is
more philosophical, although it overlaps with the mandatory public law

37. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 264.
38. See Mark W. Janis, The Nature of Jus Cogens, 3 CONN. J. INT’L L. 359, 359 (1988).
39. See id.
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analogy discussed above. The idea is that whereas treaties stem from
individual national consent, CIL represents a more communitarian social
contract. Christiana Ochoa argues, for example, that “[b]y participating in
CIL formation, each state places itself and its otherwise free exercise of
sovereign will under the direction of the collective will.”40
Social contract theory was historically developed to explain the
authority exercised by sovereign governments over individuals. The most
obvious problem with transposing this theory to the international setting is
that there is no international sovereign. Ochoa refers to the “collective
will,” but this is a fiction. Moreover, the collective in this case includes
authoritarian, repressive regimes, and there is no reason to think that
democracies like the United States have given themselves over to the will
of such regimes, or that it would be normatively desirable for them to do
so.
In any event, to say that there is an implied social contract does not
tell us the content of this contract. In particular, it does not explain why the
implicit social contract is to disallow any exit from CIL rules. Classic
international law commentators like Vattel subscribed to the social contract
theory of the state, even though they also thought nations could sometimes
withdraw from rules of CIL.41 Ultimately, this claim of a social contract
boils down to a normative claim that it would be undesirable to allow any
exit rights, but those who have made the social contract claim have not
explained why disallowing opt out rights would be normatively desirable.
Some of our respondents have suggested that a disallowance of
unilateral withdrawal follows from principles of symmetry.42 That is, they
argue that there should be a presumption that rules for terminating law
should mirror the rules for creating law.43 Applying that presumption to
CIL, they contend that because CIL is formed only through the practices
and beliefs of many nations, a single nation should not have the right to
40. Christiana Ochoa, Disintegrating Customary International Law: Reactions to Withdrawing
from International Custom, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 157, 159 (2010); see also Roberts, supra note
29, at 178 (suggesting analogy between CIL and social contract theory).
41. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 922 (1991) (“Vattel
explained the creation of the state as the product of an act of association, or social contract . . . .”);
Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role of the International Law of Personal
Jurisdiction in Domestic Courts, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373, 403 n.109 (1995) (“Vattel saw the state as
primarily an act of association or social contract.”); see also Matthew Lister, The Legitimating Role of
Consent in International Law (July 8, 2010), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/academics/
institutes/ilp/intl_law_papers/Lister_LegitimatingRoleofConsent.pdf (defending withdrawal rights from
the perspective of social contract theory).
42. See Ochoa, supra note 40, at 167-71. Roberts, supra note 29, at 188.
43. See Ochoa, supra note 40, at 169-70 (relying on John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport,
Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 418 (2003)).
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unilaterally withdraw from it. The issue, however, is not whether an
individual nation should have the unilateral ability to terminate a rule of
CIL. Rather, the issue is whether a nation should in some instances have
the unilateral right to withdraw from the rule. Such a right would not
offend any presumption of symmetry: just as under the persistent objector
doctrine a nation can affirmatively opt out of a CIL rule before it forms, it
would now have the ability to object and remove itself from the CIL rule
after it is created. Similarly, for multilateral treaties, the issue is not
whether an individual nation can terminate the treaty. Rather, the issue is
whether, just as the nation can decide whether or not to join the treaty, it
can decide later to remove itself from the treaty.
Finally, some of the respondents have argued that, even if CIL were
more analogous to a private contract than to a social contract, the analogy
would not support the allowance of exit rights because parties to a private
contract never have the legal right to withdraw from the contract
unilaterally without committing a breach.44 In fact, many contractual
relationships may be terminated unilaterally, at least with notice. Thus, for
example, only “reasonable notification” is required for unilateral
termination of an indefinite-duration commercial contract.45 Similarly,
individual employees typically have the right to withdraw unilaterally from
an indefinite-duration employment contract (otherwise they would in effect
be indentured servants). It is in fact difficult to think of any indefiniteduration contractual relationships that do not allow for unilateral
withdrawal, and contract law in fact generally forbids, as a matter of public
policy, obligations of indefinite duration. Even marriage, which can be
viewed as a relational contract that is expected to last for the life of the
parties, allows (under modern laws) for unilateral withdrawal through
divorce.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF A DEFAULT VIEW
In Withdrawing, we focused on the historical and functional case for
allowing withdrawal rights and did not address issues of implementation.
Understandably, therefore, a number of our respondents have raised
questions about how the international system might move towards a
Default View. This is a topic that deserves more consideration than we can
give it here, but we nevertheless sketch out some preliminary thoughts in

44. See Ochoa, supra note 40, at 160-61; see also Trachtman, supra note 7, at 221 (suggesting that
international law is analogous to domestic contract law and that this analogy supports the Mandatory
View).
45. See U.C.C., § 2-309(3) (1977).
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Section A. We then address specific concerns about implementation of
withdrawal rights in Sections B and C.
A. Developing Secondary Rules for CIL
Ultimately, the implementation questions raised by our respondents
concern how the secondary rules of CIL develop and change. There is little
guidance on this issue in the CIL literature. Most literature on CIL appears
to assume that the secondary rules of CIL creation and alteration have
always been the way that they are now. We know from the historical
analysis in Withdrawing, however, that that is not the case with respect to
elements of the Mandatory View, including the persistent objector doctrine.
More dramatically, the Mandatory View itself appears to have been a
change from an earlier view under which there were exit rights for at least
some rules of CIL. The secondary rules of CIL in fact continue to change—
for example, with the rise of the “new CIL,” as discussed above in Part I.
Despite the fact that there have been these changes, there does not appear
to be any clear understanding of, or even significant theorizing about, how
this process of change works.
If we look specifically at the persistent objector doctrine, the
secondary rule whose evolution we know the most about, it appears to owe
both its origins and development largely to a discourse in academic
treatises and journal articles (ironically, many of which were quite critical
of the idea).46 Roughly fifty years after the doctrine was first articulated by
Humphrey Waldock, the evidence of state practice or opinio juris in
support of the doctrine is still modest.47 Nevertheless, it is now a well
accepted doctrine. This example might suggest that secondary rules of CIL
can be created via academic discourse, independent of any state practice or
opinion. If so, then Withdrawing and the responsive commentary in this
volume might themselves be part of the implementation process.
We should be clear that this technique of CIL creation is not what we
are proposing. Even if academic opinion has had a significant influence on
changes in the secondary rules of CIL, this influence raises normative
considerations relating to accountability and representativeness.48 It also
creates a danger of undermining CIL by further divorcing it from the way
in which the international system actually operates. That said, we do
believe that academic debate can play a legitimate role in the process of

46. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 235-39.
47. See, e.g., Patrick Dumberrry, Incoherent and Ineffective: The Concept of the Persistent
Objector Doctrine Revisited, 59 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 779 (2010).
48. See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 13, at 1217-18.
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secondary rule creation. Asking whether existing legal rules operate
effectively and examining how they might be improved are standard topics
in academic discourse, and this discourse can help develop the arguments
for and against various approaches.
Increased academic attention to the topic can in turn lead to more
governmental discussion and ultimately a shift in state practice and opinio
juris. One potential vehicle for such a shift would be a codification project,
under the auspices of an organization such as the International Law
Commission. This is what happened with the secondary rules governing
treaties. Efforts to achieve a codification of the rules began with an
academic drafting project—the 1935 Harvard Law School research project
on international law—which produced an extensive draft convention on the
law of treaties and accompanying commentary.49 Subsequently, starting in
1949, the International Law Commission engaged in a twenty-year drafting
process that resulted in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. A
number of leading international law scholars served as the rapporteurs in
this drafting effort, and academics were heavily engaged in debating the
proper contours of the proposed treaty. Ultimately, nations were able to
agree on a wide-ranging treaty that addresses numerous issues relating to
the formation, interpretation, and termination of treaties.50 Over 110 nations
are now parties to the Vienna Convention, and even the nations that have
not ratified it (such as the United States) accept much of it as reflecting
binding CIL.
This is just one possible avenue for change. A different model would
be something like the Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction, in which
a group of scholars and jurists from around the world composed a set of
guidelines for the exercise of the CIL principle of universal jurisdiction.51
Alternatively, instead of being part of a comprehensive law reform or
codification package, change could also arise on an ad hoc basis stemming
from state positions on particular issues of CIL. It bears repeating that the
process for evolution and change in the secondary rules of CIL remains
under-studied. If all that our article does is to prompt more attention to this
49. See Harvard Research in Int’l Law, Draft Convention on Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT’L L.
653 (Supp. 1935); see also SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIES 31-32 (1970) (“[I]t would not be
an exaggeration to state that the Harvard draft constitutes the point of departure for all modern research
into the law of treaties, including the work of the International Law Commission.”).
50. The Vienna Convention reflects both codification of preexisting CIL and progressive
development of new principles. See IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES 12-13 (2d ed. 1984). Many of the secondary rules set forth in the Vienna Convention serve as
defaults—that is, they apply unless altered by express agreement.
51. See PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PROGRAM IN LAW AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, http://
lapa.princeton.edu/publications.php (last visited October 3, 2010), for a description of this project.
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issue, that itself will be a benefit. What we do know is that the secondary
rules of CIL do and can change, and that academic discussion and debate
can play a role in such change. Ultimately, change will likely depend on
whether the relevant actors in the system become persuaded that
modifications to CIL exit rights are beneficial. That issue is of course what
much of the analysis in Withdrawing was focused on.
B. Transition Costs
A different set of objections to Withdrawing concerns transition costs.
The basic argument is that, even assuming that the Default View is in
theory superior to the status quo, the costs of moving to it might be too
high and the benefits too small.
In Withdrawing, we considered in detail the costs associated with the
Mandatory View and the benefits of allowing some unilateral exit from
rules of CIL. We explained, for example, that an across-the-board denial of
exit is likely to make CIL unduly sticky and inefficient and vulnerable to
holdout problems. We also explained how a shift to the Default View
would likely increase innovation and experimentation in the development
of international law because the cost of developing new CIL rules would be
lessened and states that invoked the exit option would have an incentive to
articulate alternative rules. Furthermore, we explained how an exit option is
likely to facilitate the enforcement of international law, both by making
CIL rules clearer and by making violations of CIL rules (as opposed to
withdrawals) a more reliable indicator of bad state behavior. Finally, we
explained that, in light of the substantial overlap that exists today between
the substantive content of CIL and treaties, a shift to a Default View would
likely increase treatymaking, since nations would no longer need to worry
that establishing a treaty would create CIL that would lack an exit option.52
Some of our respondents nevertheless suggest that the benefits of a
shift to the Default View will be small. There are two versions of this
“small benefits” argument. The first is that the Mandatory View, while the
officially articulated position regarding CIL exit rights, is honored more in
the breach. The claim is that the current system of CIL is so amorphous and
uncertain that nations can stay within the system and still, via arguments
about exceptions or what the relevant rule really requires, exit or alter rules
that they dislike.53 As a result, the argument goes, any benefits from a
Default View are already being achieved through de facto exit mechanisms.

52. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 245, 250, 259-60, 262-63.
53. See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 17, at 59; Lim & Elias, supra note 19, at 151-52; Swaine,
supra note 22, at 215.
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As we explained in Withdrawing, even if this de facto exit argument
were correct, there are still benefits to shifting from a system of de facto
exit to de jure exit.54 Among other things, a system of de jure exit is more
consonant with rule of law values than a system of de facto exit and
thereby has the potential to enhance CIL’s legitimacy. A de jure exit
system would also enhance the availability of information because exits
would be express and public, whereas nations are likely to attempt to
conceal information in a system of de facto exits. More information in turn
would make it easier for nations to make appropriate adjustments in their
international relationships.
In any event, a system in which a nation’s ability to exit is a function
of it making arguments to manipulate the extant vague rule is unlikely to
benefit all nations equally. As with any manipulable legal system, the
higher the degree of manipulability, the bigger the advantage for those who
have better lawyers and greater control over the legal institutions. They are
not only better situated to create exit opportunities for themselves, but also
to block the exit of their weaker counterparts. In effect, we end up with a
system that operates as more of a default system for the rich and powerful
nations and more of a mandatory system for the others. A formal shift to
acknowledging the Default View would put the differently situated nations
on more of an even footing.
Even for powerful nations, however, the vagueness and manipulability
of CIL will not always provide a feasible exit mechanism. A nation
attempting to persuade others of a previously unknown CIL rule or an
exception to an existing CIL rule must still marshal evidence of state
practice and opinio juris. While there is undoubtedly extensive room to
argue about the implications of historical materials, the very vagueness and
manipulability of the materials also allows others to contest these
arguments, using the same kinds of techniques. Moreover, there remain
limits to what can be found in historical evidence, and sometimes there
simply will not be any such evidence to invoke in support of a new rule or
an exception to the old rule.55 In any event, as discussed below in Section
C, powerful nations would derive benefits from a shift to the Default View
even if their own exit ability were not enhanced.

54. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 262.
55. The modern proponents of a doctrine of Odious Debts, which would expand the set of
exceptions to the strict rule of governmental successor liability for state debts, found exactly that in
their attempts to construct a historical case for their doctrine out of the writings of a Russian jurist,
Alexander Sack. See Sarah Ludington & Mitu Gulati, A Convenient Untruth, Fact and Fantasy in the
Doctrine of Odious Debt, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 595 (2008); Sarah Ludington et al., Applied Legal History:
Demystifying the Doctrine of Odious Debt, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L., 247, 249-50 (2010).
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A different version of the small benefits argument infers from the fact
that no one (apart from the two of us, and perhaps also Andrew Guzman)
appears to be complaining about the current system that the current system
cannot be all that bad.56 This is a Chicago School-type efficient markets
argument: if the current system were really inefficient, there would be more
actors clamoring to alter it. The flaw in this argument is that, even if the
Mandatory View were sub-optimal, there are a multitude of reasons why it
might not be challenged. There is a literature on the stickiness of standards
in the context of private contracts, and the basic question that is asked there
is why sophisticated actors (including nations) often adhere to suboptimal
standards even though the system as a whole would be better off with a
shift to a new standard.57 Among the reasons for this divergence between
individual incentives and social incentives can be first-mover costs, loss
aversion, status quo biases, network externalities, and negative signals.58
Many of these same factors are likely relevant to the secondary rules of
CIL.
In any event, developing countries have in fact long complained about
aspects of the Mandatory View, as we discussed in Withdrawing.59 While it
is true that powerful Western countries have not explicitly challenged the
Mandatory View, this is probably due in part to the fact that they have the
resources to work around some of the inefficiencies that it creates. It is also
unrealistic to expect foreign ministries, even in the most developed
countries, to operate at the level of legal theory, as opposed to arguing
about specific outcomes. While one should expect legal scholars to operate
at this level, there has been a widespread assumption in the academy that
the current mandatory system has always been in place, an assumption that
makes it less likely that there will be challenges. One driving force for our
writing Withdrawing was the finding that the Mandatory View might not
have had the long historical pedigree that it is implicitly assumed to have,
and that its adoption in the literature may have rested on normatively
unattractive premises. Furthermore, as explained above in Part I, there is
hardly contentment in the legal academy with the currently prevailing
conception of CIL. Indeed, this conception is increasingly being challenged

56. See Roberts, supra note 29, at 188-89.
57. As Omri Ben-Shahar and John Pottow explain: “It is by now recognized that factors beyond
drafting costs might also cause parties to stick with an undesirable default rule; that is, parties might
choose not to opt out of a legal default even when a better provision can easily be identified and
articulated at a negligible drafting cost.” Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of
Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 651 (2006) (emphasis added).
58. See id. at 652-60.
59. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 230.
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on a variety of fronts, and new questions are being raised about the role of
CIL in a world of multilateral treatymaking.
A different cost-benefit critique of our proposal concerns the costs of
shifting from the Mandatory View to the Default View. One version of this
critique is that the transition process will involve a period of uncertainty
during which some nations might act opportunistically—for example, by
exiting when they ordinarily would not be permitted to do so even under a
fully-developed Default View.60 A second version is that misbehaving
nations might take advantage of the period of uncertainty to shape the
Default View in a fashion that allows them to act even more
opportunistically in the future—perhaps by adopting a version of the
Default View that does not contain the various limitations that we suggest.
In considering these arguments, it is important to bear in mind that the
current system does not appear to be operating at a level of clarity and
certainty. Moreover, as we have explained, the possibility of exit is likely
to enhance clarity, since nations would have to explain what they were
opting out of (and, likely, what they were opting into), and the threat of exit
could also give nations additional incentives to create treaties to settle
contested issues.61
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the process of shifting to
a new standard would inject additional uncertainty into the system, the
question to ask is which nations are likely to take advantage of this
uncertainty to exit. The more powerful nations presumably are the most
comfortable with the general corpus of existing CIL, since they have had
predominant influence over its creation. Perhaps, however, our respondents
are imagining a different set of nations, nations that are not influential
within the international system and are looking for opportunities to exit
their legal obligations so as to be able to impose externalities on neighbors
or harm their own people. The question is not whether these rogue nations
might misbehave—they presumably already do that under the current
system. Rather, the issue is whether the possibility of formal exit from CIL
rules will encourage additional misbehavior. As explained in Withdrawing,
we think this is unlikely, since these actors are the least likely to want to
articulate their position and absorb the reputational and reciprocity
consequences associated with that position.62
Another concern expressed by some of our respondents is that the type
of Default View that finally gets adopted will not be the one with the

60. See Roberts, supra note 29, at 185.
61. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 271-72.
62. See id. at 260-61.
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various limitations that we have suggested, such as notice requirements to
protect reliance interests, and restrictions on exit for CIL rules addressing
significant agency and externality problems. This concern, however,
suggests that the actors with the most influence on the development of the
CIL system will favor unrestricted exit rights, which seems highly unlikely.
If anything, the richer and more powerful nations, which will have the most
influence on any shift of the CIL system, are more concerned about
reliance interests, externalities, and agency problems than their less
developed brethren. Moreover, as CIL has changed in the past, it has
developed limitations to restrain state misbehavior, and there is no reason
to think that this will not be true of future changes to CIL, including
potentially a shift to the Default View.
The possible limitations we discussed in Withdrawing would likely
address many of the concerns that have been expressed about the costs of
implementation. One of our respondents expresses the concern, for
example, that an opt out right from CIL could destabilize existing treaties
because nations might claim new CIL interpretive views vis-à-vis the
treaties they previously entered into (for example, about whether treaties
are binding on sub-national governments).63 It is likely, however, that an
adjudicator would hold the parties to their mutual understanding at the time
of ratification, not after the fact. Consistent with that idea, the Default
View that we have proposed (and which was articulated by a number of
nineteenth century commentators) would operate only prospectively. In any
event, states will have a strong incentive not to withdraw from the usual
rules of CIL of treaty interpretation, even prospectively, because doing so
would raise the cost of entering into new treaties.
C. Feasibility
The next set of objections concerns feasibility or practicality. Even if
the Default View is superior to the Mandatory View, it is claimed, certain
structural features of the current system will render a shift infeasible. The
first objection is that even if it is clear that the Default View is superior to
the Mandatory View, powerful nations within the system have incentives to
block such a move.64 The second objection is that the creation process for
CIL is so amorphous that it does not lend itself to tailored exit rules for
different types of CIL.65

63. Brewster, supra note 5, at 50-51.
64. Estreicher, supra note 17, at 58-59.
65. Id. at 59.
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The most potent objection against the Default View is a pragmatic one
concerning incentives. If the Mandatory View benefits the strong states
more than the weaker states (or at least disadvantages them less), as it
probably does, then efforts to shift to a Default View may be doomed to
failure. What little we know about the processes by which international
standards and norms shift suggests that certain key states—often big
players with the most at stake—need to take the lead in inducing the shift.66
To be sure, powerful states should have an incentive to take the lead in
improving the CIL system, since they typically have the largest number of
interstate relationships and therefore the most to gain from improvements
in the legal system that governs those relationships. But in a suboptimal
system that allows the powerful states to derive excess gains from
opportunistic behavior at the expense of the smaller and weaker states,
these powerful states may decide not to invest resources in producing a
shift toward a better standard. In the worst case scenario, the powerful
states may even use resources to block any attempted shift by the other
nations.
While this is a significant objection, it probably had more validity
when CIL was inductively derived from longstanding state practice,
because powerful states have greater opportunity to create and influence
this practice. As we discussed in Withdrawing, however, there have been
increasing efforts to base CIL on the declarations of international bodies,
where the weaker countries have more voice, and on treaties that might not
have been ratified by all the powerful nations.67 These changes in the way
that CIL is understood, which are still very much in a state of flux, may
mean that powerful nations will increasingly have more to gain from a shift
in approach to CIL, or at least that these nations may have less reason to
resist a shift.
In any event, we acknowledge that it may be difficult to move to a
better system if we simply wait for the current system to evolve over time.
From a Coasean bargaining perspective, though, this is a familiar problem.
When the total social gains from a shift to a new system are significant and
positive, the solution is to find a mechanism that will reduce transaction
costs and enable the different sides to come together to figure out a new
way to share the gains from an improved system (since, left to their own
devices, they may not evolve towards this new system). Once again, the
66. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts, 53 EMORY L.J.
929 (2004) (describing Mexico’s leadership in leading a shift in international contractual standards);
Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INDUS.
ORG. 887, 901 (1998).
67. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 213.
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treaty analogy can help here. A treatymaking process similar to the one that
was used to address secondary rules relating to treaties (which resulted in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) could be used to address
the secondary rules of CIL, including withdrawal rights. This process
would both help solve the coordination and bargaining problems, and also
go a long way towards reducing any negative signal that might be
associated with an effort to relax the Mandatory View.
A different pragmatic objection is that the structure of CIL simply
does not allow for the kind of tailoring of CIL exit rules that we suggest at
the conclusion of Withdrawing.68 In other words, it is not clear how the
vague evolutionary process of CIL generation can produce exit rules that
discriminate between those situations in which the Mandatory View is
appropriate and those situations in which the Default View is appropriate.
This argument appears to be overstated in that current CIL theory
already has some variation in exit rights—most notably between ordinary
CIL, which allows for persistent objection and treaty override, and jus
cogens norms, which do not.69 In addition, other areas of CIL have
developed variegated limitations on state behavior that are thought to be
meaningful, including limitations on rights of exit. Consider, for example,
the CIL of countermeasures. Under certain circumstances, states are
permitted to take measures that would otherwise violate international law
as a countermeasure in response to another state’s breach.70 In other words,
the law of countermeasures allows states to temporarily exit from their
international obligations vis-à-vis particular breaching states. There are
restrictions, however, on this exit right. For example, as a matter of CIL,
countermeasures are not allowed if they would violate international
restrictions on the use or threat of force or if they would undermine
fundamental human rights protections, and they must be proportional to the
injury suffered.71 If CIL can develop restrictions like these, it is not clear
why it cannot develop similar restrictions on exit rights under a Default
View of CIL.

68. See, e.g., Trachtman, supra note 7.
69. See, e.g., Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 291,
298-301 (2006); Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Jus Cogens 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331,
336-37 (2009).
70. See INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, ARTICLES ON RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR
INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS, arts. 4-11 (James Crawford, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).
71. See id. at arts. 50, 51. Other areas of CIL similarly have uncodified limitations designed to
ensure that nations act reasonably. For example, the CIL governing the use of defensive military force
requires that the use of force be both necessary and proportional.
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In any event, it is possible that not much tailoring would be needed in
order to move to a Default View. There could be a regime, for example, in
which exit would be allowed unless it would undermine reliance interests
or impose substantial externalities.72 Alternatively, given the substantial
overlap that now exists between CIL and treaties, one could imagine CIL
exit rights that would largely track the exit rights under the corresponding
treaties.73 Reasonableness requirements that are thought already to exist
under CIL could also play a useful role.74
IV. WILL IT MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
A final objection to our project is that allowing for withdrawal rights
under CIL will make no difference in state behavior and thus is not worth
even a modest cost of transition. Even if nations formally have a right to
exit from CIL rules, the argument goes, they will not utilize this right and
will instead do what they already do: argue about the content of CIL,
engage in surreptitious violations, and the like.75 Commentators who raise
this objection point to the experience with the persistent objector doctrine,
which is almost never invoked.76 They also note that withdrawing from a
rule of CIL will be costly for a state because it requires a public
acknowledgement that the state is an outlier.77
The underutilization argument is in obvious tension with arguments
by some of our other respondents, who fear that a shift to the Default View
will be too effective and thus will create uncertainty and opportunism and
prompt an excessive number of withdrawals from CIL rules.78 In any event,
the lack of use of the persistent objector doctrine is likely explained by
structural features that would not exist for subsequent exit rights.
Moreover, experience with a variety of exit rights under treaties suggests
that, although nations are not likely to invoke CIL exit rights with great
72. Trachtman appears to agree with us that exit rights would be appropriate in the absence of
reliance or externality problems, although he questions whether international law is needed in those
situations. See Trachtman, supra note 7, at 231.
73. See Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Custom: Analogies to Treaty Withdrawals, 21 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 65 (2010).
74. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 392, 420 (Nov. 26) (disallowing withdrawal from jurisdiction because notice was given only a
few days before the case was brought).
75. See Estreicher, supra note 17, at 61-62.
76. Id. at 61 (citing sources making this point); see also Dumberry, supra note 9, at 381 (noting
that “there is no actual state practice supporting” the persistent objector doctrine).
77. See Estreicher, supra note 17; see also Dumberry, supra note 9, at 388 (making the point that
the persistent objector doctrine is not used very often because its use would show a “state’s isolation
from the rest of the international community”).
78. See Ochoa, supra note 40; Roberts, supra note 29.
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frequency, there will be situations in which they will find that the benefits
of doing so will outweigh the costs. In addition, there are a number of
reasons to believe that an increased availability of exit from CIL will
improve the quality of CIL and help revitalize this body of international
law.
A. Persistent Objector Doctrine
While it is true that nations have made little use of the persistent
objector doctrine, this is probably due to several structural limitations that
are built into the doctrine. First, to successfully invoke the doctrine, a
nation must object to the CIL rule before it forms. The process of CIL
formation is highly uncertain, however, so a nation is unlikely to know
precisely when a custom has evolved into a binding norm. Moreover, a
nation might not have any interest in the issue covered by the CIL rule until
after a binding norm is formed, and yet by that point, according to the
Mandatory View, it is too late to object. Second, a nation must repeatedly
and prominently object to the rule on the international stage.79 This means
that, instead of engaging in quiet diplomacy, the nation must selfconsciously generate a substantial amount of friction with the nations that
are seeking to solidify the custom, and this friction is likely to be costly in
terms of possible retaliation and loss of opportunities for cooperation.
Third, given the inevitable uncertainty over whether a particular CIL rule
has formed, a nation that does not wish to be bound by such a rule might
not wish to object to it, let alone do so repeatedly and prominently, for fear
that such objections will be used by others as evidence that the rule already
exists, which, in turn, could produce the argument that the objecting nation
is bound.
These structural limitations are all removed under the Default View. A
nation would not need to know precisely when the CIL rule had formed,
since it could opt out, with adequate notice, even after the rule formed. Nor
would there be a requirement of repeated and continued objection. A single
clear objection would suffice, diminishing the amount of friction that has to
be created. And a nation desiring exit would not need to be concerned that
by announcing its desire to exit, it was inadvertently helping to create a rule
that others might then argue that it was restricted from leaving.
One might still ask why a nation would invoke subsequent opt out
rights when doing so reveals that this nation is an outlier on a particular
issue. While providing this information can entail a cost, such a cost is
likely to be lower in at least some instances than the cost of either violating
79. MARK VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 14 (1985).
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the CIL rule or continuing to acquiesce in it. For example, if a nation is
relatively weak and violations of the rule are easily detected, exit from a
suboptimal CIL rule may be a more attractive option than a breach.80
Moreover, the cost of being an outlier will vary depending on the particular
issue area and the extent to which the nation has a reputation for
opportunism. A nation can also take a variety of steps to reduce the
reputational cost of exit, such as enacting domestic legislation that ties its
hands in a way that demonstrates that it is not exiting for opportunistic
reasons, or proposing and unilaterally following a superior alternative to
the CIL rule. That is one reason, as we explained in Withdrawing, why
“good” states are more likely to use the exit option than “bad” states.81
Importantly, experience with a variety of exit rights under treaties
shows that states often provide this sort of outlier information even when it
might seem contrary to their interests to do so. Nations have invoked treaty
withdrawal clauses in an appreciable number of instances, even though
such invocation is a highly public act.82 They also have frequently invoked
derogation clauses in human rights treaties, even though this requires
providing information about their deviations and exposing themselves to
scrutiny and criticism.83 Similarly, nations often have attached reservations
to their ratification of treaties, even though this, too, has an informationforcing effect.84

80. A possible example would be exit from the CIL rule of strict governmental succession to debt
obligations, including debts that are “odious.” Cf. Ludington et al., supra note 55. To avoid reliance
problems, a nation would presumably need to announce the exit prior to incurring the debt obligation.
In that situation, creditors, recognizing a new risk, would likely demand that the borrower provide
credible assurances that it was not incurring odious debt. A “good” government might be able to
provide such assurances by harnessing external monitors—either international organizations such as the
World Bank or the IMF, or NGOs like Transparency International—which could certify the character of
the government and its use of proceeds. In effect, the opt-out mechanism might allow the governments
of countries that previously had weak democratic institutions to both credibly signal their intentions to
behave well and to harness external forces to police those intentions. For discussion of how ex ante or
continuing certification might work, see, for example, Seema Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, Odious
Debt, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 82 (2006), and Omri Ben-Shahar & Mitu Gulati, Partially Odious Debts, 70
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 73-75 (2007).
81. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 260. Allowing lawful exit as an alternative to
surreptitious violation may also increase the likelihood that nations will be socialized towards law
compliance. Cf. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 667-69 (2004) (discussing this possibility in
connection with derogation clauses in human rights treaties).
82. See Helfer, supra note 73, at 69-70.
83. See Emile Hafner-Burton, Laurence R. Helfer, and Christopher J. Fariss, Emergency and
Escape: Explaining Why States Derogate from Human Rights Treaties During National Emergencies,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract _id=1622732.
84. See Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 307, 335-38 (2006).
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B. Revitalizing CIL
Not only will subsequent opt out rights be used more often than the
persistent objector doctrine, such rights will also better serve one of the
central purposes of the persistent objector doctrine. As explained
in Withdrawing, the persistent objector doctrine was adopted in part to
facilitate the creation of CIL.85 There had been a concern in the post-World
War II era that CIL rules might not be able to develop if one or a small
number of nations objected. The persistent objector doctrine was viewed as
helping the international system avoid this veto problem, by allowing CIL
to develop in the face of objection.86 Because of the way it is structured,
however, the persistent objector doctrine is almost a nullity in international
law.
As Estreicher notes, allowing subsequent opt out rights, by contrast, is
likely to facilitate the creation of CIL.87 Such opt out rights provide nations
with a form of insurance, in case they find after supporting a rule of CIL
that it does not serve their interests.88 This insurance is likely to make
nations more willing to support new developments in CIL. This helps
explain why withdrawal clauses are so common in treaties—they facilitate
treatymaking by providing a form of insurance. To take one example,
consider efforts to abolish the death penalty through CIL. Nations that are
uncertain about whether it is in their interest to shift away from the current
CIL rule allowing capital punishment may not want to support a change in
this rule of CIL because, once the new CIL rule forms, they will be unable
to exit from it. Such a nation might reasonably be concerned that if their
public later demanded the death penalty, or they came to the conclusion
that they needed it for criminal deterrence, their options would be unduly
restricted. If they knew in advance that they could later withdraw from the
CIL rule, however, these concerns would be reduced, making them more
likely to support the change in the CIL rule. Implicitly, the United Nations
has recognized this possibility when it has supported resolutions calling on
nations to adhere to a moratorium on the death penalty, a step that would be
85. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 233.
86. Id.
87. Estreicher views this potential increase in the volume of CIL as a flaw in the Default View,
but his concern appears to reflect some general hostility to CIL. By contrast, we see the Default View as
a means of revitalizing CIL, a source of international law that has increasingly become the subject of
criticism for its incoherence, inefficiency, and lack of utility for addressing modern problems.
88. See, e.g., Timothy Meyer, Power, Exit Costs, and Renegotiation in International Law at 8
(Oct. 2009) (draft), http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=timothy
_meyer; Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1599-1601 (2005); Alan O. Sykes,
Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis of the GATT ”Escape Clause” with Normative
Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1991).
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reversible if a nation later decided to re-impose that form of punishment.89
It is only the Mandatory View that seems oblivious to the ex ante effects of
disallowing withdrawal.
Allowing subsequent exit rights will also likely improve the quality of
CIL. As we explained in Withdrawing, the option to exit can serve as an
effective signaling device for nations seeking to communicate with each
other about the need to reform existing laws.90 By contrast, the current
system under the Mandatory View does not provide for effective signaling.
Signals work best when they can send a clear and reliable message about
some underlying complex reality and they are credible in that they would
be too costly to send if the underlying message was not real.91 As
Estreicher notes, however, the current system facilitates a body of vague
and amorphous CIL that allows nations to purport to stay within the system
(that is, face little risk of being called a law violator) while arguing about
what the CIL rule really requires.92 In such a system, nations engage in a
form of cheap talk, or what Estreicher calls “law-speak.” Cheap talk is a
form of communication, but not a very effective type because the talk is
neither clear nor credible.
The Default View also has the potential to improve the substantive
content of CIL rules. Under the Default View, a nation would have the
opportunity to evaluate the operation of the rule for some period of time
before deciding whether to continue to be bound by the rule or whether to
exit and perhaps propose an alternative rule. This possibility of opting out
after the rule has formed will increase the opportunities for exit, thereby
increasing the utilization rate of the exit option under the Default View. As
Guzman recognizes in his proposal to reform the persistent objector
doctrine, many nations might not have a significant interest in a CIL rule
when it is forming, but may develop such an interest later.93 Under the
Default view, these nations, which previously had little ability to object to a
89. See Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Landmark Text Calling for
Moratorium on Death Penalty, U.N. Press Release GA/10678 (Dec. 18, 2007).
90. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 260; see also Meyer, supra note 88, at 17 (making the
point, in the treaty exit context, that the use of the exit option can send a credible signal that the exiting
nation is serious about the need to renegotiate the existing regime).
91. On the question of what kinds of communications work as effective signals, see Patrick Shin
& Mitu Gulati, Showcasing Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). For a general discussion of
signaling, see ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18-27 (2000).
92. See Estreicher, supra note 17, at 59.
93. Recognizing this limitation in the persistent objector doctrine, Guzman has suggested that
nations should be allowed to exit from CIL rules after they form. However, his proposal would allow
exit only when the nation first develops an interest in the issue. The problem with this approach is that it
does not allow for the possibility that the interests of nations can change beyond the initial development
of an interest. See Guzman, supra note 14, at 169-71.
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rule, will now be able to do so. Further, because nations will likely exit at
the points in time when their interests are implicated (as opposed to when
the law forms), the quality of their reasons for exiting will be higher. That,
in turn, should help produce higher quality alternative rules for nations to
exit to. To be sure, allowing exit rights would not eliminate all of the
conceptual and practical difficulties associated with modern CIL, but it
would at least create the possibility of incremental improvement to this
important body of international law.
V. FURTHER RESEARCH
Our respondents raise a number of good questions with respect to the
arguments in Withdrawing. Where possible, we have attempted to answer
those questions. Nevertheless, there remain a variety of gaps in our
knowledge, and any effort to improve the secondary rules of CIL would
benefit from additional research that addresses those gaps. In this final
section, we identify some of the potential research projects that could
advance our understanding of exit from CIL.
First, while we believe we have come close to estimating when the
shift to the Mandatory View occurred in the literature, we still have not
pinpointed this development precisely. If this could be done, it might
improve our analysis of why the shift occurred. We hypothesized that the
shift to the Mandatory View had to do with the changing balance in power
between the Western powers and the newly independent states. However,
the historical evidence we cited in support of this hypothesis in
Withdrawing was limited.
Second, our unearthing of an original Default View for at least some
rules of CIL is largely derived from the writings of scholars such as
Vattel.94 We have relatively little concrete evidence of state practice at the
time, let alone its evolution over time.95 Similarly, we have relatively little
information concerning modern state practice under the Mandatory View.
Among other things, it would be useful to know whether and to what extent
there has been a disjunction over the years between the actual practices of
nations with respect to exit and the articulations of the Default or
Mandatory views in the treatises.
Third, even our review of the scholarly record only scratched the
surface. Most of the scholarly writing we considered after the eighteenth
century was from the United States and Great Britain, and it would be

94. See Swaine, supra note 22.
95. The need for more evidence of actual state practice is emphasized by Lim & Elias, supra note
19.
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useful to know more about the views of continental European scholars
about exit rights under CIL. It would also be useful to understand in more
detail the connections between the “voluntarist” school of international
law, which was popular in the early to mid-twentieth century, and both the
Default and Mandatory Views.96
Fourth, although we explored in detail the development of the
persistent objector doctrine, we did not study other developments in CIL
doctrine in the twentieth century, such as the increased emphasis on the
opinio juris requirement and the jus cogens category. It is quite possible
that a study of these and other modern developments would yield additional
insights about the shift from the Default View to the Mandatory View and
about how the Mandatory View has operated in practice.
Fifth, while Larry Helfer’s work on exit rights under treaties has been
an invaluable source of insights,97 more work in that area is needed. As
mentioned in Withdrawing, we know relatively little about the design and
use of exit clauses in different types of treaties and how patterns may have
evolved over time.98 We also know little about the conditions under which
exit rights are invoked and the characteristics of the nations involved. It
would be useful to have this empirical information in thinking about how to
design exit rights under CIL.
Finally, although we considered a variety of theoretical arguments
relating to the efficiency of CIL under the Mandatory View, we did not
analyze the efficiency of specific CIL rules.99 We believe our assumptions
about how CIL works are reasonable for purposes of the arguments we
make, but it would be useful to have a detailed analysis of CIL in at least a
handful of areas that considers whether the relevant customary rules in
those areas work optimally. The area of environmental law, for example,
strikes us particularly likely to yield insights, given that the external
conditions have changed so rapidly in that area. It would also be useful to
study whether inefficient CIL rules are indeed sticky, as we suggest they
are likely to be.
CONCLUSION
The Mandatory View of CIL, by disallowing unilateral exit under all
circumstances, stands in stark contrast to the approach that nations have

96. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 228.
97. See Helfer, supra note 88.
98. For some helpful recent work relating to the design of exit clauses, see Barbara Koremenos &
Allison Nau, Exit, No Exit, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 81 (2010).
99. See Brewster, supra note 5.
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followed when negotiating treaties, even though CIL and treaties frequently
overlap and treaties are often the principal evidence cited in support of CIL.
The categorical disallowance of exit under the Mandatory View is also
anomalous when considered from the perspective of scholarship on exit
rights in areas such as contract law, constitutional design, and voting rights.
Despite these anomalies, the international law academy has taken the
Mandatory View for granted, perhaps because of a mistaken historical
assumption that unilateral exit has always been disallowed for CIL. This is
a particularly appropriate time for a reexamination of the Mandatory View,
as CIL has come under increasing challenge on a variety of fronts and
multilateral treatymaking has displaced some of the traditional functions of
CIL. We hope to have contributed to that reexamination both in our initial
article and in this symposium.

